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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 






SB BUILDING ASSOCIATES, L.P.,  A New Jersey Limited Partnership; SB 
MILLTOWN INDUSTRIAL REALTY HOLDINGS, LLC, A New Jersey Limited 
Liability Corporation; ALSOL CORP., A New Jersey Corporation, 




BOROUGH OF MILLTOWN;  
MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE BOROUGH OF MILLTOWN; 
MILLTOWN FORD AVENUE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY 
_____________ 
       
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey                                                            
District Court  No. 3-07-cv-04127 
District Judge: The Honorable Anne E. Thompson                             
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 13, 2012 
 
Before: SCIRICA, RENDELL, and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 13, 2012) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Plaintiffs SB Building Associates, L.P., SB Milltown Industrial Realty 
Holdings, LLC, and Alsol Corporation challenge the alleged taking of their land by 
Defendants the Borough of Milltown, New Jersey, various Milltown officials, and 
the Milltown Ford Avenue Redevelopment Agency.  On Defendants‟ motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, the District Court rejected all of Plaintiffs‟ federal 
claims, declined to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs‟ state law claims, and 
issued judgment in favor of Defendants.  We will affirm. 
I 
On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “[j]udgment will not be granted 
unless the movant clearly establishes there are no material issues of fact, and he is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  We must view the facts presented in the 
pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party.”  Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 
2005) (internal citation omitted).  Our review is plenary.  See id. at 219. 
This case began with Defendants adopting a redevelopment plan for an area 
of Milltown, encompassing multiple properties, including the property owned by 
Plaintiffs.  Since then, Defendants have taken steps toward redeveloping both the 
property in question and the surrounding area.  In response, Plaintiffs have brought 
multiple state actions challenging the redevelopment under various legal theories.  
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Thus far, Plaintiffs have been unsuccessful. 
This is the first federal action filed by Plaintiffs.  The claims involved – 
though closely related to the prior state actions – appear to be unique to this federal 
action.
1
  Essentially, Plaintiffs contend that Milltown‟s initial resolution 
authorizing the redevelopment did not specifically and unambiguously designate 
the area as one in need of redevelopment, as required by New Jersey law.
2
  As a 
result, all subsequent actions in pursuit of that redevelopment are unlawful, both as 
a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and as a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process.  On 
Defendants‟ motion for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court rejected all 
of Plaintiffs‟ federal claims, declined to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs‟ state 




First, Plaintiffs challenge Defendants‟ actions to redevelop the property as 
violating substantive due process.  “A substantive due process violation is 
established if „the government‟s actions were not rationally related to a legitimate 
                                                 
1
 Nevertheless, we do not decide the applicability of claim or issue preclusion.  
2
 Even under the procedural posture of this case, we need not accept Plaintiffs‟ 
assertion that Milltown failed to properly designate the area as one in need of 
redevelopment.  Interpretation of the relevant ordinance is a question of law.  
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this opinion, we assume Plaintiffs are correct.  
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government interest‟ or „were in fact motivated by bias, bad faith or improper 
motive.‟”  Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 
1998) (quoting Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phila., 5 F.3d 685, 692 (3d Cir. 
1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Plaintiffs do not contend that 
Defendants are motivated by bias, bad faith, or improper motive.  Plaintiffs 
contend solely that Defendants‟ actions are not rationally related to a legitimate 
government purpose because Milltown failed to first properly designate the 
property as an area in need of redevelopment. 
Importantly, the Plaintiffs do not challenge Defendants‟ contention that the 
property actually is in need of redevelopment.
4
  Instead, Plaintiffs bootstrap their  
allegation that the Defendants failed to properly designate the property as one in 
need of redevelopment into a contention that such a failure renders Defendants‟ 
actions arbitrary and violative of due process.  This is incorrect.  “Mere violation 
of a state statute does not infringe the federal Constitution.”  Sameric, 142 F.3d at 
596 (quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944)). 
Plaintiffs would have us declare that the Defendants‟ alleged failure to 
satisfy the procedural requirements of New Jersey law removes any logical basis 
                                                                                                                                                             
3
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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for Defendants‟ actions.  But in determining whether Defendants‟ actions violate 
substantive due process, we only ask whether the Defendants “could have had a 
legitimate reason” for taking steps toward redeveloping the property at issue.  
Sameric, 142 F.3d at 595 (quoting Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 
1023, 1034, 1035 (3d Cir. 1987)) (emphasis added).  Given Defendants‟ 
undisputed progress toward redeveloping the area in question – including adoption 
of a redevelopment plan, selection of a redeveloper, and completion of various 
administrative procedures – we can presume that the Defendants could indeed have 
had a legitimate reason:  they could have believed that the property was in need of 
redevelopment.  Again, the Plaintiffs never challenge whether the property is 
actually in need of redevelopment, only whether the Defendants properly declared 
it to be so.  Such is not the making of a substantive due process claim. 
Second, Plaintiffs challenge various actions of the Defendants as takings 
without just compensation.  The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not 
prohibit valid governmental takings, but it does require that the government 
provide just compensation for the property it takes.  Consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent, we have held that takings claims are not ripe until “(1) „the 
government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final 
                                                                                                                                                             
4
 This may well be because SB expressed support for redevelopment in a letter to 
the Redevelopment Agency (Borough App‟x at 2), but SB‟s motivations are not 
 6 
 
decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue‟ (the 
„finality rule‟) and (2) the plaintiff has unsuccessfully exhausted the state‟s 
procedures for seeking „just compensation,‟ so long as the procedures provided by 
the state were adequate.”  Cnty. Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 
164 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Williamson Cnty. Regional Planning Comm’n v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 194-95 (1985)).  The latter rule, requiring 
exhaustion of state remedies, applies regardless of whether the takings claim is 
facial or as-applied to a particular property.  See Cnty. Concrete, 442 F.3d at 168. 
For the purpose of this opinion, we will assume (without deciding) that SB 
has properly alleged a taking of its property.  SB does not allege that it has 
exhausted or even attempted to exhaust state procedures for seeking just 
compensation.  Rather, it asserts that New Jersey‟s procedures for seeking just 
compensation are clearly inadequate and that pressing its claim in a state forum 
would be futile.  We disagree. 
As the District Court properly concluded, New Jersey provides an avenue of 
redress for property owners seeking just compensation.  According to the 
Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, “an appropriation of 
property by a governmental entity or private corporation having the power of 
eminent domain without its having undertaken to condemn or pay compensation 
                                                                                                                                                             
relevant to our holding. 
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for the taking, can be redressed by the owner‟s action in the nature of Mandamus 
to compel institution of condemnation proceedings.”  In re N.J. Cent. Power & 
Light Co., 400 A.2d 128, 129 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).  Plaintiffs make no 
attempt to distinguish this case, on which the District Court relied.  Plaintiffs do 
point to cases where litigation failed to yield compensation for the parties involved, 
but this does not make the available remedy inadequate.  Because we conclude that 
the remedies available under New Jersey law are adequate and the Plaintiffs have 
failed to exhaust their options in the New Jersey courts, they cannot satisfy the 
second prong of the test from County Concrete.  Therefore, it is not necessary to 
examine the first prong. 
 Finally, as the District Court properly dismissed the federal claims, it was 
well within its discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
Plaintiffs‟ state law claims.  See Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster,  45 F.3d 780, 
788 (3d Cir. 1995). 
We will affirm. 
 
